Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 4 Summer 2013

Article 6

September 2013

Drawing the Line: DNA Databasing at Arrest and
Sample Expungement
Jesika Wehunt

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jesika Wehunt, Drawing the Line: DNA Databasing at Arrest and Sample Expungement , 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol29/iss4/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.

Wehunt: Drawing the Line: DNA Databasing at Arrest and Sample Expungement

DRAWING THE LINE: DNA DATABASING AT
ARREST AND SAMPLE EXPUNGEMENT
Jesika S. Wehunt*
New technologies test the judicial conscience. On the one
hand, they hold out the promise of more effective law
enforcement, and the hope that we will be delivered from the
scourge of crime. On the other hand, they often achieve these
ends by intruding, in ways never before imaginable, into the
realms protected by the Fourth Amendment.
—Judge Kozinski, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth
1
Circuit

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, news headlines across the country have been
splashed with stories of cases considered cold for decades until a new
sample of DNA revealed who committed the crime.2 Not only is
DNA increasingly used to identify the culprit responsible for a crime;
many innocent people have been exonerated thanks to new advances
in DNA evidence.3 As technology advances, it promises to reveal
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to Professor Jessica D.
Gabel for all of her advice and friendship, and thanks to Daniel French for his support and
encouragement through the development of this Note.
1. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 871 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing
the Ninth Circuit’s majority holding that DNA sampling is constitutional).
2. See, e.g., Al Baker, In Manhattan, District Attorney Sees DNA as Tool to Solve Cold Cases, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/nyregion/district-attorney-vance-sees-dnaas-tool-to-solve-cold-cases.html; Colin Moynihan, Cold Case DNA Unit Links Rikers Inmate to ‘86
Murder, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/nyregion/ny-cold-case-unitlinks-dna-to-86-murder.html; Michael Stetz, Cold Case Murder Solved After 31 Years, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Feb. 10, 2008), http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20080210/news_1m10carrier.
html.
3. To date, in the United States, 306 convictions have been overturned based on DNA evidence.
DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_
on_PostConviction_DNA_Exonerations.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2013). The 306 exonerees served an
average of over thirteen years, and eighteen served on death row. Id.
DNA is a powerful component of the forensic science and criminal justice systems; it can
link seemingly unrelated crimes, resolve cold cases, track violent offenders both in and
out of the penal system, solve crimes which would have been previously unsolvable, and

1063

Published by Reading Room, 2013

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 6

1064

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:4

even more information about individuals from their DNA in the
future.4 Given the growing number of real-world, high-profile cases
solved with DNA evidence, fictional television increasingly features
shows that depict the use of DNA to solve crimes.5 Consequently, the
public has greater awareness of how DNA works, and juries demand
DNA evidence from prosecutors in exchange for a conviction.6
In response to this demand for DNA evidence, all fifty states and
the federal government allow, by statute, both collection of DNA
from select individuals and storage of DNA in databases.7
Traditionally, those convicted of felonies were required to submit
DNA samples; however, more recently, the federal statute and some
state statutes have been amended so that those who have been
prevent innocent people from going to prison. Currently, DNA is also being used to
exonerate the innocent.
DNA Evidence, Cases of Exoneration, ENOTES, http://www.enotes.com/forensic-science/dna-evidencecases-exoneration (last visited Mar. 21, 2013).
4. United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2007). The possible future developments in
DNA:
raise[] questions both about the kind of personal and private information that may be
derived from the DNA samples in the DOJ’s possession, and the uses of that biometric
data as scientific developments increase the type and amount of information that can be
extracted from it. For example, commentators have discussed the potential for research to
identify genetic causes of antisocial behavior that might be used to justify various crime
control measures.
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 769 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011) (note that
under California Rule of Courts 8.1105(e)(1), an opinion is no longer considered published if the
Supreme Court grants review). See generally Dorothy Roberts, Collateral Consequences, Genetic
Surveillance, and the New Biopolitics of Race, 54 HOW. L.J. 567 (2011) (discussing the fear of using
DNA as a new form of Jim Crow racial profiling).
5. Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic Tattle Tale Based on
Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 5 (2010) (“High profile paternity and criminal cases
become part of water cooler conversation, and the ‘ripped from the headlines’ approach of popular
television programs (such as NCIS, Criminal Minds, Forensic Files, and, of course, the various
incarnations of CSI and Law & Order) continue the soap opera where reality left off.”).
6. This demand for DNA evidence has been coined the “CSI effect.” E.g., Tom R. Tyler, Viewing
CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J.
1050, 1050 (2006). Mr. Tyler defined the term:
The “CSI effect” is a term that legal authorities and the mass media have coined to
describe a supposed influence that watching the television show CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation has on juror behavior. Some have claimed that jurors who see the highquality forensic evidence presented on CSI raise their standards in real trials, in which
actual evidence is typically more flawed and uncertain.
Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006). For examples of state laws, see: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-610 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 51st Legislature (2013)); MINN. STAT. § 299C.155
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. through ch 10).
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arrested are also required to submit samples.8 In the majority of
states that take DNA samples upon arrest, DNA samples and profiles
of individuals who are not ultimately convicted are not automatically
destroyed; rather, the exonerated individuals must go through a
lengthy process of requesting an expungement.9
While opponents have brought many constitutional challenges to
the collection and storage of DNA under the Fourth Amendment,
most courts that have reviewed the state statutes requiring DNA
samples from convicted persons have found them constitutional.10 In
August 2011, however, the California Court of Appeals reviewed the
jurisprudence surrounding the constitutionality of DNA collection at
arrest in People v. Buza and found the California statute for DNA
collection at arrest, Proposition 69, unconstitutional.11
This Note addresses the constitutionality of the collection and
retention of DNA samples from individuals at arrest and proposes a
statutory scheme for utilizing DNA evidence while protecting
arrestees’ privacy rights by requiring judicial probable cause and
placing the burden of expungement on the state. First, Part I provides
8. Leigh M. Harlan, Note, When Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the
Destruction of DNA Samples, 54 DUKE L.J. 179, 186 (2004). The original DNA Identification Act
included mandatory samples from only those persons convicted of a felony. The act was amended in
2005 to include arrestees. H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(I), at 38 (2005); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A)
(“The Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney General in regulation, collect DNA samples
from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted or from non-United States persons who
are detained under the authority of the United States.”); David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA Data
Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 180–81 (2001); State that Have Passed Arrestee
DNA Database Laws, DNARESOURCE.COM (Sept. 2011), http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/
ArresteeDNALaws-2011.pdf [hereinafter States with DNA Arrestee Laws]. Twenty-five states have
passed arrestee DNA database laws as of September 2011. Id. For example, California’s law states:
Each adult person arrested for a felony offense . . . shall provide the buccal swab samples
and thumb and palm print impressions and any blood or other specimens required
pursuant to this chapter immediately following arrest, or during the booking or intake or
prison reception center process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest, but,
in any case, prior to release on bail or pending trial or any physical release from
confinement or custody.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg. Sess.).
9. States with DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 8 (diagram with states that require application for
expungement); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg.
Sess.); Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758–59 (reviewing expungement procedures in California).
10. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759–61. For further discussion on the constitutionality of DNA
samples, see generally D.H. Kaye, Who Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting
DNA and Other Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188 (2006).
11. See generally Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 753.
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a brief history of the use of DNA and the statutory schemes that
mandate the sampling and retention of DNA.12 Next, Part II analyzes
the constitutionality of DNA sampling at arrest—as well as the
subsequent retention of DNA samples and profiles of citizens who
are not convicted—under the Fourth Amendment and in light of the
2011 California Court of Appeals decision, People v. Buza.13 Finally,
based on the analysis used by the California Court of Appeals in
Buza, Part III proposes that DNA profiles and samples should be
collected upon arrest of a suspect only with a judicial finding of
probable cause. If collected, the sample should be destroyed upon
immediate acquittal—instead of the current popular scheme used by
most states and the federal government that requires the individual to
request expungement and does not differentiate the type of probable
cause required for sample collection.14
I. DNA COLLECTION AND DATABASING
A. The Foundations Of DNA Use
The fathers of DNA, James Watson and Francis Crick, declared on
February 28, 1953, that they “had found the secret of life.”15 In fact,
they had uncovered the double-helix structure of deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) and subsequently made their research public, continuing
to research and publish their findings.16
DNA is the foundation on which an individual’s entire genetic
makeup stands.17 A person’s DNA is like a genetic fingerprint; the
DNA that is found in a person’s blood is identical to the DNA found

12. See discussion infra Part I.
13. See discussion infra Part II.
14. See discussion infra Part III.
15. Robert Wright, Molecular Biologists Watson & Crick, TIME, Mar. 29, 1999, at 172, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990626,00.html (discussing the lives and scientific
discoveries of James Watson and Francis Crick). For more information on the discovery of DNA, see
Leslie A. Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and Crick, NATURE EDUC. (2008),
http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/discovery-of-dna-structure-and-function-watson-397.
16. J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure of Deoxyribose
Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
17. See generally A. JAMIE CUTICCHIA, GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, 8–16 (2009).
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in his skin cells.18 In fact, DNA is identical in every cell of a person’s
body and is unique to each individual.19 The four “bases” of DNA are
Cytosine (C), Guanine (G), Thymine (T), and Adenine (A), and the
sequencing and order of these “bases” are what make a person’s
unique DNA pattern.20 “More than ninety-seven percent of DNA is
identical between all people,” but the remaining base sequences,
called polymorphic loci or “junk DNA,” are what make each
individual unique.21 These junk DNA are analyzed to identify
suspects in DNA sampling.22
DNA sampling for forensic identification purposes first occurred
in Great Britain in the 1980s, more than thirty years after the
discovery of DNA.23 Soon after this discovery of “DNA
fingerprinting,”24 the United States had its first conviction based on
DNA technology in 1987.25 DNA provided an immediate way to
identify offenders and quickly link them to a crime more efficiently
than other typical methods, such as fingerprinting and mugshots.26
DNA technology became the method of choice for forensic
examination for many reasons: it has “high discrimination power”;27
18. See generally id. at 8–11.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 7.
21. ANDREI SEMIKHODSKII, DEALING WITH DNA EVIDENCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 12 (2007). “It is these
individually varying regions, known as polymorphic loci, that are used in DNA profiling and
identification techniques.” Harlan, supra note 8, at 185; see also Gabel, supra note 5, at 9 (referring to
the regions of DNA that house individual identity as “junk DNA”).
22. Cf. SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at 12.
23. Id. at 21–22. British scientist Dr. Alec Jeffreys first used DNA to identify a rapist in a police
investigation in 1986. Debra A. Herlica, Note, DNA Databanks: When Has a Good Thing Gone Too
Far?, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 952 n.8 (2002) (describing the first use of DNA in a criminal
investigation); Heidi C. Schmitt, Note, Post-Conviction Remedies Involving the Use of DNA Evidence to
Exonerate Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners: Various Approaches Under Federal and State Law, 70
UMKC L. REV. 1001, 1002 (2002) (discussing Alec Jeffreys’s discovery).
24. Gabel, supra note 5, at 11 (“The process of collecting and analyzing a DNA profile is often
referred to as DNA ‘typing,’ ‘fingerprinting,’ or ‘profiling.’”); see also SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at
12 (arguing that the use of the term “DNA fingerprinting” may be widely accepted but is “somewhat
confusing” and that “the analogy between conventional and DNA fingerprinting is not helpful”).
25. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). In 1987, Tommie Lee
Andrews was convicted of rape after a DNA match was made between his blood sample and semen
recovered from the victim. Id.; see also Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s
Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 773 (1999); supra note 24.
26. RON C. MICHAELIS, ROBERT G. FLANDERS & PAULA H. WULFF, A LITIGATOR’S GUIDE TO DNA
xiii (2008); Gabel, supra note 5, at 12.
27. SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at 2. “No two people, with the single exception of idential twins,
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the DNA of an individual remains the same for his entire lifetime;28 it
is inherited from his parents;29 DNA samples remain stable over
time;30 and it is easily obtained from the smallest of samples of
biological materials.31 Today, DNA fingerprinting has become the
“gold standard” of forensic analysis and is widely accepted by
courts.32
B. The DNA Sampling And Matching Process
1. Collecting the DNA Samples
In an investigation, DNA must first be collected at the crime
scene.33 “Blood, semen, saliva and other types of bodily fluid or
tissue are the most common types of biological evidence collected at
crime scenes.”34 The unique DNA sequences from the collected
have identical DNA.” Id. Therefore, “every DNA profile obtained is virtually unique” to an individual.
Id.
28. Id. DNA’s “biometrical parameters” for an individual do not change as that individual grows
older, and the DNA profile remains the same regardless of what kind of biological sample is obtained.
See id.
29. Id. Family members have similar DNA profiles, which has led to controversial “familial DNA
searches” of databased DNA. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109
MICH. L. REV. 291, 294–301 (2010) (discussing the mechanics of DNA databasing and familial
searches). Familial DNA searches, which cross-reference two persons to see if they are related based on
their DNA, is beyond the scope of this Note. For more information on familial DNA searches, see
generally Gabel, supra note 5, at 19.
30. See SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at 2. DNA is resilient, “can be produced from very old and
decayed biological samples,” and “withstand[s] both natural and man-made environmental injury.” Id.
31. Id. (“[A] single hair, skin flake or small droplet of sweat left at the crime scene is often sufficient
to obtain a full DNA profile . . . .”); Gabel, supra note 5, at 13 (“As DNA harvesting went beyond the
bounds of blood, evidence took the form of semen, saliva, hair, tissue, bones, teeth, and sweat found on
or in clothes, soda cans, hairbrushes, toothbrushes, stamps, envelopes, Kleenex, chewing gum, cigarette
butts—anything a person would come in contact with.”).
32. Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime
Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 171 (2007) (noting DNA profiling as “the current gold standard in forensic
science”); see also 8 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 749 (1990) (“[T]he validity of the underlying
principles of DNA identification testing is perhaps the easiest hurdle to overcome for the proponent of
that evidence.”); William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 60 (1989) (“There is nothing controversial about the
theory underlying DNA typing. Indeed, this theory is so well accepted that its accuracy is unlikely even
to be raised as an issue in hearings on the admissibility of the new tests.”).
33. Paul E. Tracy & Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 21st
Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635, 649 (2000).
34. SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at 23. Other type of DNA samples analyzed include “semen,
saliva, hair, tissue, bones, teeth, and sweat found on or in clothes, soda cans, hairbrushes, toothbrushes,
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evidence samples are isolated and prepared to be cross-referenced
with the DNA of potential suspects by lab technicians.35
Potential suspects may voluntarily provide a comparison sample,
or the collection of a comparison sample may be mandated by
statute.36 Samples can be taken voluntarily from a mass population of
potential suspects in a process that is referred to as “DNA
dragnets.”37 State or federal statutes can also require the submission
of a DNA sample under certain conditions.38 When DNA collection
was in its earliest stages, “only people . . . convicted of serious sexual
crimes” were required to submit DNA samples.39 As the popularity
of DNA testing grew, “many states began collecting DNA from
murderers, then other violent felons, and, most recently, all felons
and even some misdemeanants.”40 Since a 2006 amendment to the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, the federal government has
allowed collection of arrestee DNA samples merely upon arrest, prior
to any conviction.41 Statutes in twenty-five states also require
suspects to provide DNA samples upon arrest.42
stamps, envelopes, Kleenex, chewing gum, cigarette butts—anything a person would come in contact
with.” Gabel, supra note 5, at 13. For deeper analysis on how various biological samples are analyzed,
see generally SEMIKHODSKII, supra note 21, at 21–26.
35. Robert Berlet, Comment, A Step Too Far: Due Process and DNA Collection in California After
Proposition 69, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1481, 1486 (2007).
36. Harlan, supra note 8, at 186–87.
37. Id. DNA dragnets collect samples from a large group of people who may have had the ability to
perpetrate the crime. Id. Dragnets do not require warrants since the samples are typically voluntarily
given; however, some scholars have argued against their constitutionality. Id. For more on DNA
dragnets and challenges to their constitutionality, see generally Fred W. Drobner, Comment, DNA
Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 479 (2000).
38. Harlan, supra note 8, at 186–87.
39. Kaye, supra note 8, at 180.
40. Id. at 180–81; see also, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.117 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.
through Ch. 25) (requiring that a person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor submit a DNA
sample when that misdemeanor “aris[es] out of the same set of circumstances” as a felony that the
person was also charged with); H.B. 483, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011) (proposing
expanding list of felonies required to submit DNA samples at arrest to include “assault on handicapped
persons” and child abandonment). Minnesota’s statute was upheld as constitutional in State v. Johnson.
State v. Johnson, 813 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2012) (“[W]e conclude that when a person is convicted of a
misdemeanor offense that arises out of the same set of circumstances as a felony charge and that
person’s sentence includes probation with conditions such as random urinalyses, there is a significant
reduction in that person’s expectation of privacy in his or her identity.”).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney
General in regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or
convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United
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The sampling, whether voluntary or mandated by statute, is usually
a non-invasive procedure, such as buccal swabbing.43 Once the DNA
sample is taken, a unique DNA “fingerprint” or “profile” of the
individual is created and used only for identification purposes.44 A
DNA profile is not the sample, which is the actual physical specimen
originally taken from the individual, but rather a simple series of
numbers that represent the DNA sequence and do not share any
information about a person’s individual traits.45
States.”); Kaye, supra note 8, at 180; States with DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 8; see also CAL.
PENAL CODE § 296.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg. Sess.). The statute reads:
Each adult person arrested for a felony offense . . . shall provide the buccal swab samples
and thumb and palm print impressions and any blood or other specimens required
pursuant to this chapter immediately following arrest, or during the booking or intake or
prison reception center process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest, but,
in any case, prior to release on bail or pending trial or any physical release from
confinement or custody.
Id.
42. See States with DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 8. The twenty-five states that have passed
arrestee DNA database laws are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Id.
See also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511(e)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“[A]ny
adult arrested or charged or juvenile placed in custody for or charged with the commission or attempted
commission of any felony . . . shall be required to submit such specimen or sample at the same time
such person is fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(b)
(West, Westlaw through S.L. 2013-36 of 2013 Reg. Sess.) (“The arresting law enforcement officer shall
obtain, or cause to be obtained, a DNA sample from an arrested person at the time of arrest, or when
fingerprinted. However, if the person is arrested without a warrant, then the DNA sample shall not be
taken until a probable cause determination has been made pursuant to [the statute].”); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-13-03(1) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Spec. Sess.) (“An individual eighteen years of
age or over who is arrested . . . for the commission of a felony shall provide to a law enforcement
officer . . . at the time of the individual’s arrest . . . a sample of blood or other body fluids for DNA law
enforcement identification purposes and inclusion in the law enforcement identification databases.”).
43. The most common form of DNA collection is buccal swabbing, where the “inside of a suspect’s
cheek is briefly and painlessly brushed with cotton.” Harlan, supra note 8, at 187.
44. Id.; see also People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Ct. App.) cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854
(Cal. 2011). The court held:
Analysis of the DNA may be “only for identification purposes.” A genetic profile is
created from the sample based on 13 genetic loci known as “noncoding” or “junk” DNA,
because “they are thought not to reveal anything about trait coding”; the resulting profiles
are so highly individuated that the chance of two randomly selected individuals sharing
the same profile are “infinitesimal.”
Id. (citations omitted).
45. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 757; Harlan, supra note 8, at 186–88. See also Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 14,
2013) [hereinafter CODIS FAQs]. The Federal Bureau of Investigation explains:
No names or other personal identifiers of the offenders, arrestees, or detainees are stored
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2. Storage and Maintenance of DNA Profiles
Once the DNA profile is created from a collected sample, it is of
little value unless it can be catalogued and compared with other
profiles from crime scenes. As the amount of DNA used in criminal
cases has grown, the “need to house, maintain, and recall the DNA
profiles of offenders for use in solving other crimes” on a larger scale
has also grown exponentially.46 “All fifty states have passed
legislative provisions authorizing the use of DNA databases to store
the genetic profiles of convicted criminals.”47 Additionally,
recognizing the need for an overarching profile organization system,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created the Combined
DNA Index System (CODIS).48
CODIS “coordinate[s] the various national, state, and local DNA
databases in a centralized system” that allows for the exchange of
DNA information nationwide.49 Following the creation of CODIS in
1994, “the DNA Identification Act (‘DNA Act’) authorized the FBI
using the CODIS software. Only the following information is stored and can be searched
at the national level:
(1) The DNA profile—the set of identification characteristics or numerical representation
at each of the various loci analyzed;
(2) The Agency Identifier of the agency submitting the DNA profile;
(3) The Specimen Identification Number—generally a number assigned sequentially at
the time of sample collection. This number does not correspond to the individual’s social
security number, criminal history identifier, or correctional facility identifier; and
(4) The DNA laboratory personnel associated with a DNA profile analysis.
Id. (footnote omitted).
46. Gabel, supra note 5, at 13.
47. Harlan, supra note 8, at 188. However, the states vary on what kinds of crimes require DNA
samples and if arrestees will be included in the database. See supra Part I.B.1.
48. See Gabel, supra note 5, at 13. “State [and] local law enforcement agencies are rapidly
developing their own DNA testing laboratories and looking to the Federal Government for potential
financial support.” 138 CONG. REC. H11737-01 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992), 1992 WL 280161 (Westlaw).
49. Gabel, supra note 5, at 13. The FBI’s website provides the CODIS mission statement:
The CODIS Unit manages the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) and the
National DNA Index System (NDIS) and is responsible for developing, providing, and
supporting the CODIS Program to federal, state, and local crime laboratories in the
United States and selected international law enforcement crime laboratories to foster the
exchange and comparison of forensic DNA evidence from violent crime investigations.
The CODIS Unit also provides administrative management and support to the FBI for
various advisory boards, Department of Justice (DOJ) grant programs, and legislation
regarding DNA.
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited Mar. 31, 2013).
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to create the National DNA Index System (‘NDIS’),” which allows
sharing profile information between federal and state DNA
databases, and provides states with financial support to create or
improve their existing state DNA databases.50 As of March 2013, this
multi-tiered system of local, state, and national databases contains
more than ten million offender profiles, more than 1.3 million
arrestee profiles, and almost half a million forensic profiles.51
“As soon as a DNA profile is uploaded, it is compared to crime
scene samples in CODIS; new crime scene samples are searched
against the uploaded profile, and a search of the entire system is
performed once each week.”52 If there is a match, known as a “hit,”
between a suspect profile in the database and a sample from a crime
scene, “it is confirmed with a new analysis of the profile,” and the
“submitting laboratory is notified and can notify the appropriate law
enforcement agency.”53 The number of crimes assisted by CODIS is

50. Gabel, supra note 5, at 13. The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program lays out the
eligibility requirements for a state to receive federal funding for its DNA sampling and database system,
which includes quality controls and inclusion of the samples into CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2006);
Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in Criminal DNA Databanking,
28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 210 (2000); see also Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759 (“In 2004, Congress
expanded the definition of ‘qualifying federal offenses’ to include all felonies. In 2006, Congress further
expanded the reach of the 2000 act by allowing the Attorney General to ‘collect DNA samples from
individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or convicted . . . .’” (alteration in original) (citations
omitted)).
51. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). Professor Gabel describes the
CODIS architecture:
This three-tier structure functions as a food chain, where information at the lowest level
is fed into larger mouths (databases). It begins at the local level (“LDIS”—Local DNA
Index System) where local laboratories take samples from both crime scenes and
offenders and generate them into CODIS profiles. At the second level (“SDIS”—State
DNA Index System), state law enforcement agencies input this information into their
statewide databases. At the top of the database food chain—the national level—state
profiles are uploaded into NDIS.
Gabel, supra note 5, at 14 (citations omitted); see also CODIS Brochure, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_brochure (last visited Mar. 31, 2013)
(detailing the CODIS hierarchy).
52. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758; see also Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190–91 (N.D.
Cal. 2009).
53. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758; see also Gabel, supra note 5, at 16 (“A ‘hit’ occurs when an
offender profile matches a crime scene sample at all thirteen CODIS markers. A ‘cold hit’ occurs when
an offender profile is linked to a cold case years after the crime was committed.” (citations omitted)).
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staggering—“[a]s of March 2013, CODIS has produced over 205,700
hits assisting in more than 197,400 investigations.”54
3. Expungement and Removal of DNA Profiles from Databases
Once a profile is in CODIS, it is permanently housed in the system
unless the individual seeks expungement by obtaining a court order
expunging the profile from either the state or federal government.55
State laws governing expungement of a DNA profile and sample
from the state and federal system differ, with eighteen states
expunging upon request56 and only seven states expunging the profile
and sample automatically upon non-conviction.57 For example, under
California’s DNA Act, an individual may have his sample and DNA
profile destroyed if he has “no past or present offense or pending
charge which qualifies that person for inclusion within the state’s
DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Program
and there otherwise is no legal basis for retaining the specimen or
sample or searchable profile.”58 In other words, the arrestee may not
have any crimes that qualify for inclusion in the database, but it is
ultimately up to the court to decide if there is a legal basis for
retaining the sample and profile.
The expungement process in California is also drawn out: an
arrestee has to show that “no accusatory pleading has been filed
within the applicable period allowed by law charging the person with
54. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, supra note 51.
55. The FBI provides information regarding the expungement requirements:
Laboratories participating in the National DNA Index are required to expunge qualifying
profiles from the National Index under the following circumstances:
1. For convicted offenders, if the participating laboratory receives a certified copy of a
final court order documenting the conviction has been overturned; and
2. For arrestees, if the participating laboratory receives a certified copy of a final court
order documenting the charge has been dismissed, resulted in an acquittal or no charges
have been brought within the applicable time period.
CODIS FAQs, supra note 45.
56. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Texas, and
Utah require a request for expungement. States with DNA Arrestee Laws, supra note 8.
57. Alaska, Maryland, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia expunge DNA
samples and profiles upon non-conviction. Id.
58. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg. Sess.); see also Buza,
129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758–59 (reviewing expungement procedures in California).
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a qualifying offense” or that the charges of the qualifying offense that
led to the arrest “have been dismissed prior to adjudication,”59 and
“the court must then wait 180 days before it can grant the request.”60
Even after the statute of limitations has passed, a prosecutor can
object to the individual’s request, and the court’s order allowing or
preventing expungement is “not reviewable by appeal or by writ.”61
Furthermore, if a person had the right to have his DNA records
expunged but failed to do so—either by his own delay or that of the
state—and is subsequently convicted using that DNA evidence, he
cannot appeal the arrest or conviction based on the delay.62
II. DNA COLLECTION UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
DNA collection and databasing have most frequently been
challenged under the Fourth Amendment’s “judicially created
doctrine of privacy.”63 The Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure
clause provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”64 It
is clear under the Fourth Amendment that collection of samples for
DNA databasing constitutes a search.65 Yet, courts have concluded
that the collection of the DNA sample is merely the first search in
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 299(b)(1), (c)(2)(B).
60. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758.
61. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(c)(1).
62. CAL. PENAL CODE § 299(d) (“Any identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest, or arrest
based upon a data bank or database match is not invalidated due to a failure to expunge or a delay in
expunging records.”).
63. Harlan, supra note 8, at 191; Drobner, supra note 37, at 510 (explaining that the collection of
DNA samples requires Fourth Amendment analyses because it implicates privacy interests). Defendants
have also used the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Due Process Clause, and
the Equal Protection Clause to raise constitutional challenges to DNA sampling and databasing. Aaron
P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 921, 937–38 (2001).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759. “Searches” include the collection of blood and urine, performing
a breathalyzer test, fingernail scrapings, and buccal swabbing for the collection of saliva. Id. The test for
what falls under constitutional scrutiny has been defined as the searches of parts of the body that are
“beyond mere physical characteristics . . . constantly exposed to the public.” Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 295 (1973) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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DNA collection; the actual creation of the DNA profile from the
sample and cross-referencing of that profile in the database
constitutes a second search.66 While probable cause is required to
justify the first search (the sample collection), in evaluating the
second search (the cross-referencing of that sample in a DNA
database), the measure of the constitutionality is “reasonableness.”67
The reasonable standard requires an analysis of the individual’s
“subjective privacy interest” and the public’s consideration of what is
reasonable, and it is a lower standard than probable cause.68
A. Constitutionality Of DNA Sampling From Convicted Individuals
Before the 2006 amendment to the DNA Fingerprinting Act to
include sampling of arrestees, courts had settled the debate over the
constitutionality of DNA sampling and databasing of convicts under
the Fourth Amendment.69 To uphold convict sampling statutes, the
circuits use one of two Fourth Amendment analyses: (1) the “special
needs test” or (2) the “totality of the circumstances” test.70

66. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 406 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “[t]he collection of
DNA under § 14135a entails two separate ‘searches’”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012) (mem.).
Some scholars have asserted that there are actually three searches in the DNA databasing process:
collection of the sample, initial entrance into the database, and the “multiple, recurrent searches” of the
DNA against new entries into the database. Ashley Eiler, Note, Arrested Development: Reforming the
Federal All-Arrestee DNA Collection Statute to Comply with the Fourth Amendment, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1201, 1209 (2011).
67. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1209.
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of
the [reasonableness] rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement,
first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
69. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (“Prior to expansion of the scope of the Federal DNA Act in 2006
to include the taking of DNA samples from arrestees, the constitutionality of that act was upheld by
every federal circuit presented with the issue.” (citations omitted)); id. at 760 n.7 (“Comparable state
statutes authorizing collection of DNA samples from persons convicted of qualifying offenses were also
universally upheld by federal circuit courts.” (citations omitted)). For further discussion of the
constitutionality of DNA samples, see generally Kaye, supra note 10.
70. See Eiler, supra note 66, at 1213–16. “[T]he majority of circuits—the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia—[use the] totality of the circumstances approach.”
Mitchell, 652 F.3d at 403. “Only the Second and Seventh Circuits have consistently held otherwise,
employing the special needs exception in every case concerning the constitutionality of a DNA indexing
statute.” Id. at 403 n.15. The Tenth Circuit has used both tests but, most recently, has used the totality of
the circumstances analysis. Id.
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1. The Special Needs Test
Generally, “a warrant supported by probable cause is required”
before a search.71 The special needs test allows exceptions to this
rule, permitting suspicionless searches if they are conducted for nonlaw enforcement purposes when the situation makes “the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impractical . . . .”72 Courts that have
upheld DNA collection and databasing under the special needs test
have focused on the purpose of DNA collection: “to obtain a reliable
record of an offender’s identity that can then be used to help solve
crimes.”73 The Second Circuit explained in Nicholas v. Goord:
Although the DNA samples may eventually help law
enforcement identify the perpetrator of a crime, at the time of
collection, the samples “in fact provide no evidence in and of
themselves of criminal wrongdoing,” and are not sought “for the
investigation of a specific crime.” Because the state’s purpose in
conducting DNA indexing is distinct from the ordinary “crime
detection” activities associated with normal law-enforcement
74
concerns, it meets the special-needs threshold.

2. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The “totality of the circumstances” test balances the individual’s
privacy interests and the “government’s interest in conducting a
search without a warrant supported by probable cause.”75 Therefore,
71. Tania Simoncelli, Dangerous Excursions: The Case Against Expanding Forensic DNA
Databases to Innocent Persons, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 391 (2006); Eiler, supra note 66, at 1212.
72. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). For examples of
courts upholding certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the program was designed to serve
special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement, see Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug testing of student athletes) and National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding drug tests for United States Customs
Service employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions).
73. United States v. Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007). For more examples of courts
upholding DNA databasing under the special needs test, see United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 771–
72 (7th Cir. 2006) and Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 667 (2d Cir. 2005).
74. Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 669 (citations omitted).
75. People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 760–61 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal.
2011).
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in a DNA sampling challenge, a court applying this test weighs the
governmental interest in maintaining DNA databases against an
individual’s right to the privacy of his DNA.76 In circuits that have
upheld DNA databasing of convicts, the courts have taken the
individual’s conviction into consideration of both the individual’s
interest and the government’s interest.77 In Samson v. California, the
Supreme Court recognized a “continuum of liberty interests.”78 The
court examined punishments for probationers, parolees, and convicts
and concluded that probationers have more freedom than parolees,
who have more freedom than convicts.79 Convicted offenders are
subject to a broad range of restrictions that are “severely constricted
expectations of privacy relative to the general citizenry.”80 This
diminished expectation of privacy of convicted individuals is
weighed against the governmental interest in solving crimes,
reducing recidivism, and exonerating the innocent.81 Weighing the
privacy interests of the convicted individual and the government’s
interests, courts have consistently upheld DNA statutes requiring
samples from convicted individuals without a warrant, even when
there is no suspicion that they may have committed additional
crimes.82
76. “In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, we must balance the degree to which DNA
profiling interferes with the privacy interests of qualified federal offenders against the significance of
the public interests served by such profiling.” United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 836 (9th Cir.
2004) (challenging a DNA collection statute).
77. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761.
78. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1226; see Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 848–49 (2006)
(upholding a statute that requires every prisoner eligible for release on state parole to agree in writing to
be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer with or without a search warrant
and with or without cause).
79. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 848–49.
80. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 834. “[C]onvicted offenders have been held to have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in their identity.” Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761 (citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., Samson, 547 U.S. at 853 (finding that the state’s combined interest in the supervision
of its parolees, the reduction of recidivism, and the effective reintegration of parolees into society
justified the suspicionless search at issue); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120–21 (2001)
(holding that the state had dual interests in reintegrating the probationer into society and in preventing
recidivism).
82. See United States v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941, 947 (9th Cir. 2007) (“As a direct consequence of
[Defendant’s] status as a supervised releasee, he has a diminished expectation of privacy in his own
identity specifically, and tracking his identity is the primary consequence of DNA collection.”);
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837.
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B. Constitutionality Of DNA Sampling From Arrestees
1. Arrestees with Grand Jury or Judicial Probable Cause
While the constitutionality of DNA sampling from convicted
individuals appears to be settled among the circuits, the
constitutionality of sampling from arrested individuals under the
2005 amendment to the DNA Act is less clear.83 In 2010, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of California’s decision
upholding the statutory requirement84 that certain arrestees are
required to provide a DNA sample as part of their release conditions
before trial.85 Using the totality of the circumstances test, the Eastern
District of California limited its finding to “DNA testing after a
judicial finding or grand jury determination of probable cause.”86 In a
similar case involving an indicted defendant who refused to provide a
DNA sample, the Third Circuit found the DNA Act constitutional
under the totality of the circumstances test by analogizing DNA
profiles and fingerprints, finding that a DNA profile “is used solely
as an accurate, unique, identifying marker.”87 The court reasoned that
arrestees have “a diminished expectation of privacy” because enough
probable cause existed to justify their arrest and concluded that this
amount of probable cause has been used historically to collect
fingerprints and photographs of arrestees.88 While these two cases
may seem to conclude DNA collection at arrest is constitutional, they
83. In upholding the constitutionality of sampling convicted individuals in Kriesel, the Ninth Circuit
clarified: “We emphasize that our ruling today does not cover DNA collection from arrestees or noncitizens detained in the custody of the United States, who are required to submit to DNA collection by
the 2006 version of the DNA Act.” Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 948–49.
84. See Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b), (c)(1)(A) (2006); DNA Fingerprinting Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14135a (2006).
85. United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
86. Id. (“The judicial or grand jury finding of probable cause within a criminal proceeding is a
watershed event which should be viewed differently from mere pre-judicial involvement gathering of
evidence.”).
87. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 410 (3d Cir. 2011) (calling DNA profiles “fingerprints
for the twenty-first century”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012) (mem.).
88. Id. at 412; see also Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 910 (“An arrestee has a diminished expectation of
privacy in his own identity. Probable cause has long been the standard which allowed an arrestee to be
photographed, fingerprinted and otherwise be compelled to give information which can later be used for
identification purposes.” (citations omitted)).
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both based their analyses on probable cause determined by a grand
jury or judge prior to arrest and leave unanswered whether probable
cause determined by an officer alone is sufficient.89
2. United States v. Buza: Arrestees with an Absence of Judicial
Probable Cause
In August of 2011, the California Court of Appeals in People v.
Buza addressed the collection of DNA based on the probable cause
determination of the arresting officer and found the California statute
for DNA collection from arrestees, Proposition 69, unconstitutional.90
The analysis and reasoning of the court in Buza, examining the
constitutionality of taking DNA samples from non-convicted persons
at arrest under the Fourth Amendment, asserted that the emerging
practice of DNA collection at arrest should be reconsidered.91 In
Buza, the court began by looking at Haskell v. Brown, the only case
89. The court in Buza explained:
[I]n both Pool and Mitchell, the defendants had been indicted before law enforcement
officers sought to obtain DNA samples. Whereas Pool grounded its analysis on the fact
that the defendant’s DNA sample was collected after a judicial or grand jury
determination of probable cause for felony charges had been made, Mitchell expressly
left open the question whether an arresting officer’s probable cause determination could
be sufficient.
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 765 (Ct. App.) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted), cert.
granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
90. See id. In October 2011, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-238, a
statute requiring juveniles to submit to DNA sampling following arrest for certain offenses. Mario W. v.
Kaipio, 265 P.3d 389, 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011), vacated, 281 P.3d 476 (Ariz. 2012). While this Note
does not distinguish between juvenile and adult arrestees in its analysis, the Arizona Court of Appeals
found that sampling juveniles who were arrested on an officer’s probable cause alone would be
unconstitutional. Id. at 400. The court held:
For the two juveniles . . . who have been arrested or accused but for whom there has been
no judicial finding of probable cause to believe that the juveniles have committed the
offenses for which they are charged, evaluating the totality of the circumstances leads me
to the opposite result. Without the watershed event of a judicial finding of probable
cause, I conclude that application of A.R.S. § 8-238 to take DNA samples from these two
juveniles would be unconstitutional.
Id.; see also In re Welfare of M.L.M., 813 N.W.2d 26 (Minn. 2012) (examining constitutionality of
MINN. STAT. § 609.117, subdiv. 1(2) (2010) from juvenile arrestee perspective).
91. In October 2011, the California Supreme Court granted review of Buza, and as of May 2013, the
case was fully briefed but no opinion had been issued. See Appellate Courts Case Information, CAL.
COURTS,
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/mainCaseScreen.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=1990653&doc_
no=S196200 (last updated May 24, 2013).
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to date to examine DNA collection for “arrestees who have not been
subjected to a judicial probable cause determination.”92 In Haskell,
the Northern District of California upheld the California statute
requiring arrestees to submit DNA samples, basing its decision on
two grounds: (1) lessened arrestee privacy expectations and the
DNA–fingerprint analogy; and (2) the strong governmental interest in
identifying arrestees.93 The Buza court’s analysis of the totality of the
circumstances test, as applied in Haskell, set forth several arguments
against the constitutionality of DNA sampling at arrest under both
Fourth Amendment tests.94
In Haskell, the court asserted that requiring the accused to submit
fingerprints for identification purposes is no different than a
requirement that the arrestee submit to DNA sampling upon arrest for
identification purposes.95 The Haskell court focused on the DNA
profile containing only “junk” DNA, instead of the DNA sample
itself containing all of the arrestee’s genetic makeup.96 In Mitchell,
the court emphasized that CODIS only makes the DNA profile, not
the actual sample, available and that strong protections within the
Federal DNA Act limit the cross-referencing of DNA to junk DNA
exclusively for identification purposes.97
92. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 766 (citing Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (N.D. Cal.
2009)).
93. The Haskell court examined the continuum of privacy rights:
Arrestees undoubtedly have a greater privacy interest than convicted felons, but
Plaintiffs have not shown that that interest outweighs the government’s compelling
interest in identifying arrestees, and its interest in using arrestees’ DNA to solve past
crimes. Accordingly, based on the evidence presently before the Court, California’s DNA
searching of arrestees appears reasonable.
Haskell, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. The denial of the injunction by the Northern District of California in
Haskell was upheld by the Ninth Circuit in Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9th Cir.)
(concluding “that the Government’s compelling interests far outweigh arrestees’ privacy concerns”),
reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012).
94. See generally Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761–68.
95. Haskell, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1197 (rationalizing that “everyday ‘booking’ procedures routinely
require even the merely accused to provide fingerprint identification, regardless of whether investigation
of the crime involves fingerprint evidence.” (citations omitted)).
96. Id. at 1190. DNA profiles that have the thirteen “junk” DNA are made from DNA samples taken
at arrest. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1, at 27 (2000) (“[T]he genetic markers used for forensic DNA
testing were purposely selected because they are not associated with any known physical or medical
characteristics . . . .”). See also discussion supra Part I.B.1 for more information on the sampling
process.
97. United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 407 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[The court is] also reassured by the
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As the Buza court suggested, this analogy between DNA and
fingerprints is flawed for several reasons.98 First, DNA is more
valuable evidence than fingerprints because it tells investigators more
about a suspect than a fingerprint and is more frequently found at
crime scenes.99 Scholars dispute whether junk DNA contains only
non-genetic identifying characteristics.100 Perhaps more troubling
than the doubt among scientists of what DNA can reveal today is the
possibility of what DNA can reveal tomorrow as technology
advances; there is no comparable fear of privacy invasion for
fingerprints in the future.101 DNA sampling also differs from
fingerprinting regarding the negative social stigma it carries.102
Furthermore, the practice of fingerprinting has become routine
without being analyzed under current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, leaving an unstable foundation for the analogy to stand
on.103 As the court in Buza noted, the historical basis for allowing
numerous protections in place guarding against [the] possibility [of misuse]. . . . [T]he [DNA] Act
criminalizes the misuse of both the sample and the analysis generated from the sample.” (citing 42
U.S.C.§ 14135e(c))), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741 (2012) (mem.). “By using only so-called ‘junk DNA’
to create the profile, the Government ensures that meaningful personal genetic information about the
individual is not published in CODIS.” Id. at 400.
98. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 767–68.
99. DNA can be recovered from crime scenes in many forms, such as hair, skin, and even sweat. See
supra note 24. DNA can also reveal information about family members and is used in familial database
searches. See generally Gabel, supra note 5, at 19.
100. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 768; see also United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 850 (9th Cir.
2004) (“[N]ew discoveries are being made by the day that challenge the core assumption underlying
junk DNA’s name—regions of DNA previously thought to be ‘junk DNA’ may be genic after all.”).
Some scholars have asserted that DNA may reveal personality traits that lead to criminal behavior and
that, therefore, everyone should be sampled to identify these traits early on in life. Simoncelli, supra
note 71, at 392.
101. While a DNA sample is turned into a DNA profile for entry into the database, almost every state
law and the federal DNA law require the laboratory to keep part of the original DNA sample that
contains the human genome for an unlimited length of time. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 769. Today, junk
DNA samples may indicate an individual’s race or sex, and in the near future, DNA samples promise to
reveal more about an individual’s medical characteristics. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1211.
102. “That DNA is used most commonly, both in the public perception and in reality, to detect more
heinous crimes such as rape and murder [] speaks to this negative perception.” Corey Preston, Note,
Faulty Foundations: How the False Analogy to Routine Fingerprinting Undermines the Argument for
Arrestee DNA Sampling, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 496 (2010). However, fingerprinting has
long been accepted without such a negative social stigma. Id. at 495–96.
103. Fingerprints have become part of the American way of life, without hesitation by the public:
Because the great expansion in fingerprinting came before the modern era of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ushered in by Katz v. United States, it proceeded unchecked
by any judicial balancing against the personal right to privacy. As a consequence, we
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fingerprinting is not entirely clear and thus cannot be used as the sole
foundation for allowing so-called DNA “fingerprinting” at arrest.104
To support the argument that DNA sampling is only for
identification, the Haskell court defined “identification” as “both who
that person is (the person’s name, date of birth, etc.) and what that
person has done (whether the individual has a criminal record,
whether he is the same person who committed an as-yet unsolved
crime across town, etc.).”105 The “who the person is” use of DNA
sampling is less effective and slower than fingerprinting; it takes
thirty-one days for a DNA sample to be converted into a DNA profile
and uploaded into a database, while it only takes about ten minutes
for a fingerprint to be cross-referenced to identify an arrestee.106
Also, DNA samples are not taken until after police identify the
individual, and then samples are taken only from individuals who
have not already been arrested or convicted and, thus, previously
added to the database.107 Therefore, the primary purpose of DNA
sampling cannot be to identify the arrested individual.
have become accustomed to having our fingerprints on file in some government database.
The suggestion that law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, must destroy the
fingerprints of those who were wrongfully arrested and booked, and were later released,
would today be greeted by reactions ranging from apathy to a disdainful snigger. Why?
Because we have come to accept that people—even totally innocent people—have no
legitimate expectation of privacy in their fingerprints, and that’s that.
Kincade, 379 F.3d at 874 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
104. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 770 (finding that routine fingerprinting without Fourth Amendment
analysis cannot lead to the conclusion that DNA sampling survives without a separate constitutional
analysis).
105. Haskell v. Brown, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The court stated:
Who the person is can often be checked using fingerprints, but that does not preclude the
government from also checking that individual’s identity in other ways. An individual
might wear gloves at some point, thwarting fingerprint identification, or wear a mask,
thwarting the use of photographs. The more ways the government has to identify who
someone is, the better chance it has of doing so accurately.
Id. The court in Buza considered that the use of DNA for more accurate identification goes to the actual
“investigatory value,” not the identification value as Haskell claims. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774.
106. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 772–73. DNA profiles, once in the database, do not contain any
identifying personal information such as the name of the individual that the sample was collected from.
Id. at 1448; see also discussion supra Part I.B. (explaining the DNA sampling and profile creation
process).
107. The court explained:
The first step in collecting a DNA sample by means of the “standard DNA collection kit”
provided by the DOJ to local and state law enforcement agencies is to “identify the
subject,” indicating the immediate means of “identification” is not the subject’s DNA.
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Because DNA is less efficient than fingerprints in identifying
arrestees, the second definition of identification used by Haskell, the
“what the person has done” definition, must be the real purpose
behind DNA sampling of arrestees. The court in Buza considered
Haskell’s definition and concluded that the real purpose of DNA
sampling is to determine if the individual has committed a different
crime “unrelated to the crime for which they were arrested.”108 A
closer examination of the intent of California’s DNA Act shows the
ultimate purposes of the Act are the use of DNA for crime-solving
and the need to expand the database to include more potential leads
for law enforcement.109 The Buza court concluded that the only
limitations imposed on DNA samples are that they be used for law
enforcement and may not be used to identify characteristics such as
gender or race for “non-law enforcement purposes.”110 “By merging
the ordinarily distinct concepts of verification of identity and
criminal investigation,” the Buza court held, “the DNA Act
authorizes suspicionless criminal investigation of arrestees in the
name of ‘identification,’ absent any true need or ability to use the
material collected to verify identity at the time of arrest.”111
Further demonstrating this point, since DNA samples are not taken from arrestees who
have already had samples taken, the arrestee’s identity must be verified by other means
before a DNA sample can be collected.
Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 773 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 770–77. When a DNA sample is taken and a profile is created, it is checked against a
database of unsolved crimes. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. “There can be no doubt that this use of
DNA samples is for purposes of criminal investigation rather than simple identification.” Buza, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 3d at 774; see also Haskell v. Harris, 669 F.3d 1049, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(“Proposition 69 does not authorize the taking of DNA samples from felony arrestees for identification
purposes. Rather, it authorizes the taking of DNA samples for solely investigative purposes. Such
takings are unconstitutional . . . .”), reh’g en banc granted, 686 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2012); King v. State,
42 A.3d 549, 580 (Md. 2012) (holding the Maryland DNA arrestee sampling act constitutional in the
narrow use “as a means to identify an arrestee, but not for investigatory purposes, in any event”).
109. See Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 774–75. The Buza court also questioned the actual success rates of
DNA databasing given a recent California Department of Justice study and averred that many of the
people arrested are already convicted and have their DNA in the database. This would logically result in
only a minimal increase in the success of the database with the inclusion of arrestee DNA. Id. at 776–77.
For more on the governmental interests behind the federal DNA Act and the expansion of CODIS at the
federal level, see Eiler, supra note 66, at 1221 nn.126–27.
110. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776.
111. Id. This is similar to the Supreme Court’s finding in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000), in which the Court struck down a roadblock checkpoint program designed to “detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” as it could not qualify as a special need. Id. at 38. Ordinary
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The government’s interest in investigating crime through DNA
sampling of arrestees must still be weighed against the arrested
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy. While a convict or
parolee’s expectation of privacy is diminished enough to be
outweighed by the governmental interest in collecting DNA samples,
the arrestee inherently can expect a higher level of privacy.112 The
treatment of arrestees vastly differs from the treatment of convicts or
parolees, as arrestees are not subject to mandatory searches, are less
likely to reoffend, and thus must have a greater expectation of
privacy.113 An arrestee has not been found guilty, and unless a judge
has found probable cause, the current DNA regime allows sampling
based only on the probable cause of the arresting officer.114 This
creates a welcoming temptation for officers to arrest possible
suspects of a crime on other grounds to obtain a sample of their DNA
to prove their investigative theory.115
The expungement process exacerbates the problem of potential
officer abuse. The federal DNA statute allows DNA sampling at
arrest, while some state statutes require DNA sampling immediately
after arrest.116 This immediate sampling at arrest means that even if
investigations do not satisfy the special needs test, and a warrant with sufficient probable cause is
required. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1220 (“The special needs exception[] . . . presents an insurmountable
obstacle for the federal all-arrestee law because the law enforcement rationale behind expanding CODIS
is so obviously paramount.”); see also King, 42 A.3d at 578 (“A finding of probable cause for arrest on a
crime of violence under the Maryland DNA Collection Act cannot serve as the probable cause for a
DNA search of an arrestee.”).
112. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2007); Banks v. United States, 490 F.3d
1178, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Bina
Ghanaat, Comment, Technology and Privacy: The Need for an Appropriate Mode of Analysis in the
Debate over the Federal DNA Act, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1315, 1341–43 (2009) (asserting that courts
now have the opportunity to potentially uphold all-arrestee DNA statutes given the Supreme Court’s
failure to articulate a clear rule regarding the totality of the circumstances test).
113. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761. But see Lockard v. City of Lawrenceburg, 815 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1049 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (“[A]lthough an arrestee may have a larger expectation of privacy than a prisoner,
the arrestee’s expectation of privacy is still shrunken compared to society at large.”).
114. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1218.
115. Id. at 1226. Thus, an officer can churn up probable cause to arrest an individual to collect a DNA
sample to confirm a suspicion on an entirely separate case that lacked the requisite probable cause for
arrest. Id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“The Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney
General in regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested, facing charges, or
convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the United
States.”); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1(a)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg.
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the arrest is later determined to be without cause, the DNA sample
will remain in the database until the individual applies for
expungement and will be continually cross-referenced with new
samples from crime scenes, creating additional, reoccurring privacy
violations with each search.117
III. MODIFYING SAMPLING SUBMISSION AND EXPEDITION OF
EXPUNGEMENT
The current statutory scheme used by most states and the federal
government allowing DNA sampling at arrest fails to meet the
special needs or the totality of the circumstances tests. Accordingly,
should the Supreme Court have the opportunity to hear a case
challenging the DNA Act or any of the similarly modeled state
statutes, the Court should follow the rationale of the Buza court and
hold that these statutes violate the Fourth Amendment. Although the
possibility of review and judicial remedy by the Supreme Court118
remains uncertain, the constitutional conflicts that DNA databasing
presents may quickly and easily be remedied by modifying federal
and state statutes.
While each state law could be modified individually, a nationwide
statutory remedy would be more easily effectuated by Congress.
Using its power to fund state DNA programs, Congress could add a
requirement that mandates consistent DNA databasing and retention

Sess.) (“Each adult person arrested for a felony offense . . . shall provide the buccal swab samples and
thumb and palm print impressions and any blood or other specimens required pursuant to this chapter
immediately following arrest, or during the booking or intake or prison reception center process or as
soon as administratively practicable after arrest, but, in any case, prior to release on bail or pending trial
or any physical release from confinement or custody.”).
117. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 780 (noting that the use of the profile in the database will continue
until the arrestee has it successfully expunged from the database).
118. Some scholars have proposed that a judicial remedy may be achieved by the Supreme Court
modifying the special needs test back to a “barebones version of the special needs doctrine” that does
not consider “law enforcement purpose” or else establish a new exception to the warrant requirement for
DNA searches. Eiler, supra note 66, at 1229. Others have asserted that the Supreme Court will find
DNA arrestee laws unconstitutional and will strike them down, but this would not clarify the Fourth
Amendment standard to be applied to DNA sampling and would offer little guidance to legislatures as to
what expansions of DNA sampling are constitutional. Id. at 1230.
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standards at the state level.119 Because all state samples are
eventually submitted into CODIS, the federal DNA database,
Congress can also create uniform conditions for acceptance of DNA
profiles into CODIS and require expedition of the expungement
process.
A. Limiting When To Sample And Submit
The first solution to the constitutional dilemma of DNA sampling
is the modification of when, in the judicial process, the sampling of
an individual takes place. The current federal statute allows the
collection of “DNA samples from individuals who are arrested,
facing charges, or convicted,” and many state statutes require DNA
sampling immediately following arrest.120 Reviewing the limited case
law on DNA collection at arrest, courts have upheld the statutes in
situations where probable cause has been determined by a grand jury
or judge prior to arrest but have held them unconstitutional in
situations where an officer alone determined probable cause.121
Because of the imprecise language of the statute, the line is blurred
and outcomes vary under the same statutory language. Drawing a
119. The Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program lays out the eligibility requirements for a state
to receive federal funding for its DNA sampling and database system, which includes quality controls
and inclusion of the samples into CODIS. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006). Modification of the program
requirements would be the most efficient way to ensure state compliance because the majority of state
databases rely on federal funding programs to finance their crime labs and DNA databasing systems. See
LISA HURST & KEVIN LOTHRIDGE, 2007 DNA EVIDENCE AND OFFENDER ANALYSIS MEASUREMENT:
DNA BACKLOGS, CAPACITY AND FUNDING 9 (2010), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
230328.pdf (finding that when surveying publicly funded crime laboratories that were accredited and
operating forensic DNA analysis programs, “[n]early 90%, or 133 laboratories, responded that they
would not have sufficient funding” if federal funding were no longer available).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)(A) (2006); see also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 296.1 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 3 of 2013 Reg. Sess.) (“Each adult person arrested for a felony offense . . . shall provide the
buccal swab samples and thumb and palm print impressions and any blood or other specimens required
pursuant to this chapter immediately following arrest, or during the booking or intake or prison
reception center process or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest, but, in any case, prior to
release on bail or pending trial or any physical release from confinement or custody.”); FLA. STAT.
§ 943.325(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 23d Leg.) (“Each qualifying offender shall
submit a DNA sample at the time he or she is booked into a jail, correctional facility, or juvenile
facility.”).
121. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1741
(2012) (mem.); United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 917 (E.D. Cal. 2009); People v. Buza, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
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statutory line—requiring an adequate amount of probable cause at
arrest to meet the totality of the circumstances test—remedies this
inconsistency.122 While an arrestee can expect a diminished amount
of privacy upon arrest, there is a clear difference between the privacy
expected by an arrestee—who has the evidence against him reviewed
by a grand jury of his peers or by a judge—and one who has been
arrested on the conclusion of a single officer’s (sometimes instant)
determination of probable cause for arrest.123
North Carolina’s DNA database statute recognizes this
differentiation between the kinds of probable cause:
The arresting law enforcement officer shall obtain, or cause to be
obtained, a DNA sample from an arrested person at the time of
arrest, or when fingerprinted. However, if the person is arrested
without a warrant, then the DNA sample shall not be taken until
a probable cause determination has been made pursuant to G.S.
124
15A-511(c)(1).

Under this statutory scheme, “[t]he magistrate must determine
whether there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed [the
crime] . . . .”125 Waiting to collect the DNA sample of an arrestee
until after the judicial determination of probable cause solves the

122. The “totality of the circumstances” test weighs the interest in the “individual’s privacy against
the government’s interest in conducting a search.” Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760–61; see also
discussion supra Part II.
123. When considering the continuum of privacy expected by individuals—from convicts to parolees
to arrestees—arrestees’ determinations of probable cause create separate “categories.” See Buza, 129
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 782 (“[W]ithin the category of arrestees, an individual . . . who has not yet been the
subject of a judicial determination of probable cause, falls closer to the ordinary citizen end of the
continuum than one as to whom probable cause has been found by a judicial officer or grand jury.”).
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(b) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2013-36 of 2013 Reg. Sess.).
125. Id. § 15A-511(c)(1). “A judicial official may issue a warrant for arrest only when he is supplied
with sufficient information, supported by oath or affirmation, to make an independent judgment that
there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it.” Id. § 15A-304(d). Probable cause in North Carolina must be established by affidavit or
by sworn oral testimony. Id.
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problem of arrestee privacy issues raised in Buza and also meets the
purpose of expanding CODIS.126
On the federal level, Congress can require states to implement the
probable cause threshold before granting any money to state DNA
databases and accepting any DNA sample to be included in CODIS.
In Virginia, when a DNA sample is taken and sent to the state DNA
database, a copy of the warrant establishing probable cause has to be
attached to the sample.127 If Congress required a similar showing of
probable cause before a sample may be admitted into CODIS and
made it a condition for a state database to receive federal grants
under the Debbie Smith DNA Backlog Grant Program,128 states
would be encouraged to ensure the privacy of arrestees as mandated
by the Fourth Amendment.129
B. Expediting The Expungement Process
The second remedy needed to ensure the constitutionality of DNA
databasing is expediting the expungement of DNA samples and
profiles and shifting the burden of responsibility in the expungement
process. Under the current federal statutory scheme, the Director of
the FBI as well as the individual states must expunge any DNA
sample and profile from the database upon receipt of
a certified copy of a final court order establishing that [the
qualifying offense] conviction has been overturned; or . . . a
certified copy of a final court order establishing that [the
qualifying offense] charge has been dismissed or has resulted in
an acquittal or that no charge was filed within the applicable

126. “[T]he [DNA Fingerprinting] act will allow the creation of a comprehensive, robust database that
will make it possible to catch serial rapists and murderers before they commit more crimes.” 151 CONG.
REC. S9472, 9528 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. John Kyl), 2005 WL 1797658 (Westlaw).
127. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.3:1(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. cc. 2 and 3) (“The
sample shall be secured to prevent tampering with the contents and be accompanied by a copy of the
arrest warrant or capias.”).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2006).
129. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
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130

The federal statute makes it clear that the DNA samples and
profiles of those certified not guilty are to be promptly expunged
from the database, yet, with varying state law, it remains unclear as
to who has to request the expungement. Some states require the
arrestee to apply for expungement, which can be a lengthy and
complicated process.131 Furthermore, some states will not invalidate
DNA database matches obtained due to a failure to expunge or a
delay in expungement by the state.132 Under this statutory
uncertainty, not only does the arrestee carry the burden of requesting
expungement, but he also has no recourse if the state fails to expunge
his DNA profile even after he meets this burden. The state, therefore,
has no incentive to promptly comply with the court order to expunge,
as it has nothing to lose.
North Carolina’s newly adopted statutory scheme, which went into
effect in June 2012, shifts the expungement burden to the prosecutor
by requiring her, within thirty days of acquittal or dismissal of the
case, to submit an official “verification form” to the State Bureau of
Investigations (SBI) including verification of the facts, the arrestee’s
last known address, and the signature of a judge validating the
acquittal or dismissal of the case.133 Within thirty days of receiving
130. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d) (2006).
131. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-72(a) (West, Westlaw through Act 5 of 2013 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring the arrestee to submit a “written request for expungement”; “[a] certified copy of the court
order” or a “letter from the prosecuting attorney certifying that . . . the case [was] dismissed”; proof that
“written notice [of the request for expungement] has been provided to the prosecuting attorney and the
department”; “[a] court order verifying that no retrial or appeal of the case is pending”; and that at least
180 days have passed since the prosecuting attorney received notice of the request for expungement and
has not objected); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.7 (“A person whose DNA profile has been included in the
data bank . . . may request expungement on the grounds that the felony conviction on which the
authority for including his DNA profile was based has been reversed and the case dismissed.”); see also
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758–59 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
132. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 35-3-165(b) (2012) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“A DNA
sample obtained in good faith shall be deemed to have been obtained in accordance with the
requirements of this article and its use in accordance with this article is authorized until a court order
directing expungement is obtained and submitted to the bureau.”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-72(d)
(“Any identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest, or arrest based upon a data bank match shall not
be invalidated due to a failure to expunge or a delay in expunging records.”).
133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(j) (2011) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2013-36 of 2013 Reg.
Sess.); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2:1 (“The clerk of the court shall notify the Department of
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the form, the SBI must determine if there is another legal provision
requiring the arrestee’s DNA sample to remain in the state database
and if not, must “remove the [arrestee’s] DNA record and samples”
from the database.134 This statutory scheme places the burden not
only on the prosecutor but also the SBI—as the administrator of the
state’s database—to ensure expungement of DNA samples.
The North Carolina statute also provides that within thirty days of
receiving the verification form from the prosecutor, the SBI must
mail the arrestee a notice documenting the removal and destruction of
the DNA sample and profile from the database or notice that the
“sample d[id] not qualify for expunction.”135 If this expungement
process is not enacted by the prosecuting attorney or the SBI within
the prescribed time period, the arrestee may file a motion to review,
and any “identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest, or arrest
based upon a database match of the defendant’s DNA sample which
occurs after the expiration of the statutory periods prescribed for
expunction” is “invalid and inadmissible in the prosecution of the
[arrestee] for any criminal offense.”136
If a statutory scheme similar to North Carolina’s were adopted on
a federal level, it would vastly reduce the burden on the arrestee in
the expungement process. Granting the arrestee statutory standing to
enforce the automatic expungement of DNA samples and profiles
would cure many of the Buza court’s concerns with continual crossreferencing of DNA samples in CODIS and lessen the fear of “dirty
cop” techniques to collect DNA samples.137 Congress could also
enact this scheme by placing the burden of automatic expunction of
DNA profiles and samples on the state as another requirement for a
state database to receive federal grants under the Debbie Smith DNA

final disposition of the criminal proceedings. If the charge for which the sample was taken is dismissed
or the defendant is acquitted at trial, the Department shall destroy the sample and all records thereof,
provided there is no other pending qualifying warrant or capias for an arrest or felony conviction that
would otherwise require that the sample remain in the data bank.” (emphasis added)).
134. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.3A(k).
135. Id. § 15A-266.3A(k)(3).
136. Id. § 15A-266.3A(l)–(m).
137. See discussion supra Part II.
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Backlog Grant Program138 to ensure a uniform and constitutional
scheme nationwide.
CONCLUSION
DNA has forever changed the way crime is investigated, and many
of its intricacies remain to be discovered.139 With the expansion of
DNA sampling from convicts to parolees to arrestees, a line must be
drawn to prevent “encroachment on Fourth Amendment privacy
rights”140—a line to prevent the “Orwellian prospect” of populationwide DNA sampling.141 Using the two tests for constitutionality
under current Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence—the totality
of the circumstances test and the special needs test—the Buza court
found California’s all-arrestees DNA databasing statute
unconstitutional.142
An examination of the scale of expected privacy rights reveals that
there is a difference in the probable cause determinations of judicial
officials versus the probable cause determinations of arresting
officers.143 Given this difference, the federal arrestee DNA
databasing statute, as well as many arrestee state statutes, is
unconstitutional. This constitutional defect is easily remedied,
however, by adding two conditions to receiving federal DNA
database funding: requiring judicial probable cause before DNA is
admitted into CODIS and state databases; and rewriting state statutes
to place the burden of expungement on the state instead of the
arrestee.144 Under this proposed scheme, constitutional rights of those
who are not found guilty are safeguarded and protected from
suspicionless searches, while the governmental interest of expanding
databases and catching criminals in DNA collection is promulgated
through a mutually beneficial statutory scheme.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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42 U.S.C. § 14135(a) (2006).
See discussion supra Part I.
Preston, supra note 102, at 475.
People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 783 (Ct. App.), cert. granted, 262 P.3d 854 (Cal. 2011).
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part II.
See discussion supra Part III.
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